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Neural Recruitment during Self-Control of Smoking: A Pilot fMRI

Study
John R. Monterosso, Traci Mann, Andrew Ward, George Ainslie, Jennifer Bramen,
Arthur Brody, and Edythe D. London

This chapter presents pilot data from a neuroimaging study that recorded changes in
functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) signal (an indirect indication of changes in
brain activity) while overnight abstinent cigarette smokers were given opportunities
to smoke, but were asked to try to resist the temptation to do so. This is the ﬁrst study
of which we are aware that has used fMRI to identify substrates of self-control of an
addictive behavior.
Inhibitory Control in Addiction Research
Until recently, neuroscience research on addiction has focused primarily on mechanisms of reinforcement. In the mid-twentieth century, negative reinforcement dominated the ﬁeld, as relief of withdrawal (including ‘‘conditioned withdrawal’’) was
viewed as the primary underlying basis for pathological drug use ( Jelinek 1960). For
reasons that included a spike in use of crack cocaine, which is associated with much
less obvious withdrawal symptoms than alcohol and opioids, emphasis in the late
twentieth century shifted away from negative reinforcement. Withdrawal cannot
account for all pathological cocaine use, particularly since conditioned responses to
cocaine-related cues generally are more drug-like than drug-opposite (e.g., tachycardia
rather than bradycardia; Carter and Tiffany 1999). Indeed, positive affect is a common
trigger for relapse to cocaine abuse (Shulman 1989). It became clear that positive reinforcement is central to pathological drug use. Dramatic progress was made in the neuroscience of drug reward during the late twentieth century (Koob 1996; Schultz 1997;
Wise and Rompre 1989). Especially important in this regard was the recognition that
midbrain dopaminergic neurons that project to the nucleus accumbens participate
prominently in mediating reward from all drugs of abuse (Pontieri et al. 1996).
Still, negative and positive reinforcement alone do not fully describe the territory that
the science of addiction must address. Consider the smoker who wants to quit. This
person might utilize a pharmacological aid that reduces withdrawal from smoking cessation (e.g., nicotine replacement therapy) or that reduces the positive reinforcement
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from smoking (e.g., varenicline, a partial agonist for nicotinic receptors, that, among
other effects, reduces the reward from smoking). But in addition, this person also tries
to quit. What does it mean to try to quit drug use, that is, to try not to continue using?
This aspect of addiction is, we think, central to everyday thinking about the topic. It is
this aspect of the phenomenon that the eminent psychologist Frank Logan had in
mind when he wrote, ‘‘Principles of animal behavior can provide a basis for a theory
of human drug use and abuse, but voluntary control of addictive behavior requires
uniquely human cognitive processes’’ (Logan 1993, 291).
In the last decade, addiction researchers have paid more attention to understanding
the basis of ‘‘voluntary control of addictive behaviors’’ and its failing (Goldstein and
Volkow 2002; Jentsch and Taylor 1999; London et al. 2000). Grant (2004) described
this as the beginning of a third and as yet unproven wave of addiction research (negative and positive reinforcement being the ﬁrst two). The research on voluntary control
has proceeded in parallel along several lines, variously labeled as investigations of
inhibitory control, executive function, impulse control, cognitive control, self-control, selfregulation, and willpower. This chapter uses Logan’s descriptive phrase ‘‘voluntary control of addictive behaviors’’ throughout, and does not attempt to interrelate the various
processes or subcategories of the constructs named above. We will, however, describe
three approaches to the area of research in order to provide the context for the study
presented here. We say from the outset that we do not think it inevitable, or even
likely, that all cognitive processes that underlie voluntary control of addictive behaviors will be able to be mapped onto identiﬁable neurobiology (see Ross 2005). However,
even in the absence of complete reductionism, there may well be an opportunity to
illuminate neural substrates relevant to the voluntary control of addictive behaviors.
Good Decision Making and the Voluntary Control of Addictive Behavior
Abstinence from drugs of abuse is a rational (i.e., utility-maximizing) choice given
anticipated negative consequences of continued drug taking. Individual differences in
the capacity for rational decision making may therefore constitute a substantial determinant of problem drug use. Laboratory tasks have been constructed to isolate aspects
of decision making that are thought to be relevant to drug use (Bechara and Damasio
2002; Bechara, Dolan, and Hindes, 2002; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel 1999; Rogers et al.
1999). Typically, these tasks require individuals to select repeatedly from sets of alternatives designed to isolate one or more factors, such as risk, uncertainty, or delay. The
most common approach has been to compare the performance of drug abusing and
nonabusing participants on such tasks, and in some cases, to pair the tasks with neuroimaging. This research asks, ‘‘What decision-making factors differ between drug abusers
and comparison subjects who do not abuse drugs?’’ and, in some cases, ‘‘How do
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drug abusers and comparison subjects differ in neural activity associated with decision
making?’’
Although generalizing is complicated by the myriad factors that differ from one
study to another, including the history and severity of drug dependence, the duration
of abstinence prior to assessment, and speciﬁcs of the methodology employed, drugabusing and non-drug-abusing populations appear to differ with respect to decision
making. In particular, drug-abusing subjects appear to be less risk averse (Fishbein et
al. 2005; Rogers and Robbins 2001), less sensitive to unpredictable penalties (Bartzokis
et al. 2000; Bechara 2001; Fishbein 2000; Grant, Contoreggi, and London 2000; Mazas,
Finn, and Steinmetz 2000), more driven by reinforcement history in the most immediate past (Paulus et al. 2002, 2003), more prone to behave in accordance with local versus global reinforcement rates (Heyman and Dunn 2002), and more willing to trade
reward value for reward immediacy (Bickel, Odum, and Madden 1999; Cairns and van
der Pol 2000; Coffey et al. 2003; Fuchs 1982; Kirby and Petry 2004; Kirby, Petry, and
Bickel 1999; Mitchell 1999; Moeller and Dougherty 2002; Petry 2003; Reynolds et al.
2004; Vuchinich and Simpson 1998).
Studies comparing neural activation (inferred through neuroimaging) during performance of decision-making tasks have revealed signiﬁcant anomalies among drug
abusers. Although there is some inconsistency, most studies have reported hypofrontality among drug abusers during decision making, especially within the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Bolla et al. 2003, 2005; Ersche et al. 2005; Paulus et al.
2002, 2003). Of course, cohort studies that compare drug abusers and nonabusers suffer shortcomings including indeterminacy regarding whether group differences predated substance abuse. In an important extension of cohort comparison ﬁndings, low
recruitment during a two–choice guessing task within a network of regions involved in
decision making (including the right middle frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and
posterior cingulate) was associated with subsequent relapse among abstinent methamphetamine abusers (Paulus, Tapert, and Schuckit 2005).
Although repeated reports of decision-making anomalies among drug abusers suggests the importance of decision making to the behavior, decision-making tasks may
not capture processes engaged during the struggle between a strong desire to use drugs
and conﬂicting goals such as commitments made to abstain from drug use. Indeed,
while small amounts of money have been put at stake in some decision-making tasks,
the majority of the research in this area has used hypothetical choices (Madden et al.
1997; Monterosso et al. 2001) or decision-making games where ‘‘points’’ provide the
only task incentive (Bechara and Damasio 2002; Rogers et al. 1999). Although a steeper
discounting of reward as a function of delay has, for example, been repeatedly shown
in drug abusers (Bickel, Odum, and Madden 1999; Cairns and van der Pol 2000; Coffey
et al. 2003; Fuchs 1982; Kirby and Petry 2004; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel 1999; Mitchell
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1999; Moeller and Dougherty 2002; Petry 2003; Reynolds et al. 2004; Vuchinich and
Simpson 1998), the difference appears as a preference. An individual who says that she
would, hypothetically, choose $10 today over $20 in a week may be making a bad decision, possibly even reﬂecting a tendency that puts her at risk for substance abuse. But
(to our knowledge) there is no evidence that the decision entails the type of ambivalence or motivational struggle that is associated with voluntary control of an addicted
behavior.
Behavioral Inhibition and the Voluntary Control of Addictive Behavior
An alternative approach to studying the voluntary control of addictive behavior looks
at capacity for behavioral inhibition. According to this idea, behavioral inhibition,
which can be loosely deﬁned as the intentional suppression of prepotent responses that are
goal-inappropriate, is critical to recovery from addiction, because recovery requires the
suppression of rapid, conditioned responses so that slower mechanisms can guide behavior (Fillmore 2003; Jentsch and Taylor 1999). If this conjecture is correct, deﬁciency
in behavioral inhibition could serve as a behavioral phenotype for substance-abuse
disorders, facilitating the search for genetic linkages and physiological markers. Established paradigms that tax behavioral inhibition are easily paired with imaging
methodologies. Below we consider ﬁrst the construct of behavioral inhibition, and
then the limits of evidence linking it to addiction.
Several behavioral inhibition subtypes have been proposed, with perhaps the most
agreed-upon subclassiﬁcations being ‘‘response inhibition’’ versus ‘‘interference control’’ (Barkley 1997). Response inhibition is the intentional cancellation of a behavior already underway, as when a baseball batter attempts to stop (‘‘check’’) his swing at a
pitch outside the strike zone, or as when a speaker attempts to cut off an utterance
she realizes is inappropriate. Interference control refers to protecting ongoing processes
from interference so that they can be completed, as when a speaker tries to avoid
distraction by a neighboring conversation. Although both functions are generally
included under the heading of inhibitory control, performance on response inhibition
tasks such as the Stop Signal (SST) and go/no-go tasks is not strongly correlated with
performance on interference control tasks such as the Color-Word Stroop Task and
the Flanker Task (in Friedman and Miyake 2004, r ¼ :15; in Avila et al. 2004, r ¼ :11).
The clinical literature has strongly implicated the frontal lobes in both types of behavioral inhibition. Frontal lobe lesions cause dramatic impairment on both response
inhibition and interference control tasks (Aron et al. 2003; Perret 1974). There has
been a recent spate of studies that have paired behavioral inhibition tasks (especially
the Stroop, go/no-go, and SST) with neuroimaging methodologies (Bush et al. 1999;
Garavan et al. 2002; Hester and Garavan 2004; Kaufman et al. 2003; Peterson et al.
1999; Rubia et al. 2005). In general, these studies corroborate ﬁndings from the clinical
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literature, demonstrating an association between performance on inhibitory tasks and
activation of the frontal lobes (we will defer discussion of more speciﬁc localization for
the time being).
Several studies have reported an association between deﬁcits in behavioral inhibition
and substance-abusing populations (Fillmore and Rush 2002; Monterosso et al. 2005;
Salo et al. 2005). In addition, two studies pairing versions of the go/no-go task with
fMRI found less recruitment in the frontal cortex and in the anterior cingulate cortex
and presupplementary motor area among cocaine abusers than in control subjects (Hester and Garavan 2004; Kaufman et al. 2003). As with cohort comparisons of
decision-making anomalies, it is not possible to determine whether impairment in response inhibition follows drug use (as a consequence) or precedes (perhaps predisposes
to) drug abuse.
Although it has been argued that the ability to resist temptation relies on the capacity for behavioral inhibition (Mahone et al. 2002), it is unclear how much behavioral
inhibition, as measured by speeded cognitive tasks, captures functioning that is important for maintaining abstinence. Errors on behavioral inhibition tasks result from prepotent responses that are only transiently dominant, and such errors depend on the
speeded nature of the tasks. Typically a respondent is aware of committing an error
even while completing the response, and would correct it promptly if given the
chance. By contrast, even when drugs are readily available, using them requires the execution of an action plan that remains dominant for seconds; and although the user
may experience ambivalence, self-correction does not reliably occur at all, let alone
within a few hundred milliseconds. In short, although behavioral inhibition may be integral to self-control of drug taking, dissimilarities between the phenomena warrant
skepticism regarding whether speeded inhibition tasks really correspond to resisting
everyday temptation.
The ‘‘Self-Control Challenge’’
There is emerging interest in studying the voluntary control of addictive behavior with
laboratory tasks that more directly model the real-world phenomenon. For example,
Childress and colleagues conducted an imaging protocol in which they assessed what
circuitry was recruited when individuals actively attempted to suppress craving for cocaine (Childress et al. 2003, 2004). Following the most well-established technique for
eliciting craving in drug abusers during brain image acquisition (Childress et al. 1999;
Grant et al. 1996), Childress and colleagues presented video cues depicting drug use to
a group of cocaine abusers. Participants were instructed to allow themselves to crave in
one condition, and to attempt to stop their craving in another condition. Preliminary
reports of that work indicated that relative to the condition in which craving was not
suppressed, attempts to inhibit craving recruited robust activation in inferior frontal
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gyri (Childress et al. 2003, 2004). A similar design was recently used in a study of cigarette smokers; attempt to suppress the urge to smoke resulted in activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and posterior cingulate cortex (Brody et al. 2007).
Although the suppression of craving may constitute a more direct model of the voluntary control of an addictive behavior than a speeded cognitive task like the Stroop, it
is also problematic. Since the relationship between craving and drug abuse is itself not
straightforward (Tiffany 1999; Tiffany et al. 1993), it is unclear how much the explicit
target of inhibitory control (craving) is relevant in achieving abstinence. For example,
empirical evidence suggests that at least in early recovery, the difference between more
and less effective treatment is not reﬂected in the amount of craving reported, but
rather in the frequency of drug use given the presence of high craving (Weiss et al.
2003). The recent development of methodologies for delivering primary rewards during fMRI (e.g., (McClure, Berns, and Montague 2003) allows for more direct analysis
of this phenomenon.
Pilot Study of Smoking Self-Control
We used a specialized MRI-compatible device for delivering cigarette smoke to allow us
to study the brain activity associated with the voluntary control of smoking behavior
in regular cigarette smokers. The goals were (1) to establish the viability of the method
for use in larger studies, and (2) to collect preliminary evidence regarding the brain
regions that are active when abstinent cigarette smokers voluntarily abstain from an
opportunity to smoke.
Method
Ten smokers, who were not seeking treatment, were recruited from a list of previous
research participants who gave permission for further contact. All had been previously
screened for the presence of Axis I disorders. At a baseline screening session, participants were given a full explanation of the procedures and provided informed consent
in accordance with the University of California Institutional Review Board. They completed a magnetic resonance imaging safety screening form, and were in good general
health, right handed, and 18–50 years of age. They reported smoking 10 or more cigarettes per day, and had b 18 ppm CO in their expired breath in the screening session.
Potential participants were excluded if they reported a history of neurological disease
(e.g., stroke) or of head trauma, reported claustrophobia (which would preclude fMRI),
or were pregnant.
During the baseline test session, the participants were trained to smoke through the
‘‘MRI-Hookah,’’ a specialized smoking device that is compatible with the MR environment. To approximate the scanning environment, participants were positioned supine
on a cot, and ﬁt with their own Silastic mask. After smoking through the apparatus,
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participants were asked to rate the experience of smoking through the hookah on a
scale between 10 and þ10 with the following anchors provided: 10 ¼ ‘‘very unpleasant,’’ 5 ¼ ‘‘moderately unpleasant,’’ 0 ¼ ‘‘neither pleasant or unpleasant,’’
þ5 ¼ ‘‘moderately pleasant,’’ and þ10 ¼ ‘‘very pleasant—equal to normal smoking.’’
Participants in the baseline session were invited to participate in fMRI testing only if
they reported (1) smoking > 10 cigarettes per day, had CO scores > 18 ppm, and rated
smoking through the MRI-Hookah as at least a ‘‘þ5’’ (moderately pleasant). Participants included in the study were predominantly female (6 of 10) and Caucasian (8 of
10). The mean age of participants was 30.3 e 4.5 and the mean number of cigarettes
smoked per day (according to self-report) was 16.3 e 3.2.
Subjects were instructed to abstain from smoking for 12 hours before their scheduled
participation in the Smoking Self-Control Challenge. CO was assessed at the beginning
of the test session to verify abstinence (a 8 ppm was required). After completing the
Smoking Self-Control Challenge (described below) subjects were again assessed for CO
in expired breath. Participants were then asked to indicate how difﬁcult they found it
to refrain from smoking on ‘‘self-control’’ test blocks. To increase the desire to smoke
during the task, participants were informed that an additional 1.5 h of monitored
abstinence would be required after they completed the task.
Self-Control Challenge Task Design
Prior to the Smoking Self-Control Challenge, participants were read task instructions
and given a practice of several trials (outside the scanner). Most important, the instructions informed participants that there would be times during the task in which they
would have access to cigarette smoke, but during which they should try to refrain;
‘‘We’d really like it if you could try not to smoke on as many of these rounds as you can manage. . . . We realize that it may be difﬁcult to resist smoking, but try your best.’’ Our goal in
choosing this particular wording was both to encourage self-control efforts, but at the
same time, to convey that failure was not tantamount to breaking the rules of the experiment. Figure 10.1 provides a schematic of a single trial of the Smoking Self-Control
Challenge. Each trial began with a 12–second video clip of smoking cues (e.g., a cigarette being lit). After the clip, subjects were asked to indicated whether or not they
wished to smoke (see below). If they responded in the afﬁrmative, depending on the
particular trial, subjects were either informed by the computer (1) ‘‘Smoke available—
but try not to,’’ or (2) ‘‘Valve closed, smoke unavailable’’). An experimenter outside the
scanner room signaled to an assistant inside the scanner room which type of trial was
about to begin, and the assistant positioned the valve accordingly. During self-control
trials, the assistant inside the scanner room watched the cigarette that was held in tubing within the MRI-Hookah (see ﬁgure 10.2). Inhalation on the part of the participant
was readily detected as a brightening of the ambers at the end of the cigarette. The
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Figure 10.1
Schematic of one trial of the Self-Control Challenge. Each of two task runs consisted of twelve
trials.

Figures 10.2
MRI-Hookah. A. Schematic representation of the fully enclosed continuously vented smoking
apparatus. B. Facemask used by the subject to inhale smoke. The smoke is delivered through the
center cannula of a concentric dual hose apparatus. The expired smoke is exhausted through the
outer tube.
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occurrence of inhalation was signaled to the experimenter, who recorded the event
through a button press on the computer that ran the experimental task. During these
trials, if subjects smoked, the computer presented the word ‘‘Smoking’’ to the participant for 5 sec. On ‘‘Smoke Unavailable’’ trials, the aforementioned ‘‘Valve closed,
smoke unavailable’’ message appeared on the screen for the trial duration. Each task
run was conducted until 6 Smoke-Unavailable and 6 Self-Control trials were completed
(regardless of how many times the participant abstained on those trials). Each participant completed two task runs lasting approximately 8 minutes, separated by a short
break. After completing each imaging session, participants were asked to rate how difﬁcult they found it to not smoke on self-control trials.
The MRI-Hookah
The MRI-Hookah was developed to allow cigarette-smoke inhalation simultaneous to
image acquisition (R21 DA13627–02; Enabling Technologies in fMRI and Cigarette Smoking, PI Cohen). The device introduces no MRI artifacts, allows the subject to inhale and
exhale both smoke and room air through nose or mouth, and quickly removes smoke
and excess odors so that these secondary reinforcers may be kept under experimental
control. It delivers smoke to the subject through a close-ﬁtting Silastic mask, which
includes a mouthpiece that the subject places comfortably in his or her teeth (ﬁgure
10.2a and 10.2b).
Use of a standard surgical oxygen mask ensured that the subjects are able to breathe
through both the nose and mouth. Air was expired through a low-velocity vacuum system, which draws air continuously through a large-bore tube, ﬁtted concentrically
around the smoke delivery tube. When cigarette smoke was made available, a gated
valve within the MRI-Hookah was opened, allowing smoke to be drawn through the
mouthpiece. When the subject was not inhaling cigarette smoke, one-way valve ports
on the side of the mask passed room air freely. In this way the smoke odor, which
might act as a secondary reinforcer and therefore a contaminant in experiments, was
removed from the environment as quickly as possible.
MRI Data Acquisition
Imaging parameters We used a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra system for all acquisitions
(see note for details1). Stimuli were displayed on magnet-compatible video goggles
(Resonance Technology, Northridge, CA). This display presents VGA screen resolution
(800  600 pixels with 24-bit color depth) with a nominal visual angle of about 30
horizontally and 20 vertically. Correction for individual myopia or hyperopia was accomplished by the insertion of lenses. During the scans, subjects responded to the
‘‘yes/no’’ question regarding whether they wanted to smoke by pressing a two-button
magnet-compatible keypad. The touch pad was placed under the ﬁngers of the subject’s dominant hand (right only, per inclusion criteria).
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Image Analysis
Functional image processing and analysis Preprocessing procedures are described in
the note below.2 Subsequent to preprocessing, both task runs for each subject were
analyzed individually in the ﬁrst level of analysis. For each participant, a second-level
analysis combined the Z-statistical maps from the task runs (except for one participant,
for whom one run was discarded due to excessive head motion). The resulting statistical maps from these second-level analyses (also Z-statistic maps) served as inputs for
group analyses (‘‘third level’’). Activation maps for main effect consist of voxels with
Z > 2.3, with cluster-level signiﬁcance (correcting for whole brain search) of p < :05.
Results of Smoking Self-Control Challenge Pilot Study
Subjects voluntarily abstained on 56.2% of Self-Control trials. No subject smoked on
all Self-Control trials, and only one subject abstained on all Self-Control trials. Subsequent to the experiment, the participants reported a mean rating of difﬁculty in maintaining self-control of 6.9 e 2.1 (of a possible 10). For the primary contrast, we assessed
the difference between fMRI signal during Self-Control trials in which the participant
succeeded (Voluntary Abstinence) and Smoke-Unavailable trials. Self-Control trials in
which the participant smoked were excluded from this contrast, in part because of artifacts related to smoking.
The primary imaging results are presented in ﬁgure 10.3 (in radiological space). Three
clusters were identiﬁed in which the fMRI signal was greater during Voluntary Abstinence trials, relative to Smoke Unavailable trials. The largest cluster (1,769 voxels; ﬁg.
10.3, top right and bottom right) included portions of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC, BA32) and supplementary motor area (SMA BA8 and BA6). A second cluster
of signiﬁcant extent (654 voxels; ﬁg. 10.3, bottom left) was observed in the right superior and middle frontal gyri (SFG, MFG, BA9; encompassing more medial aspects of the
DLPFC). A third cluster of signiﬁcant extent (577 voxels; ﬁg. 10.3, top left, top right,
and bottom left) was centered in the right inferior frontal gyrus and encompassed part
of the insula as well (IFG, BA 47, extending to BA 45).
Deactivations in the primary contrast (i.e., clusters in which BOLD signal was greater
during Smoke-Unavailable than Voluntary Abstinence trials) were also identiﬁed
(though are not presented visually). The largest cluster of deactivation (1,532 voxels)
was observed in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and extended dorsally into the
precuneus (BA 30 and 31). The next largest cluster (895 voxels) was observed in the
ventral portion of the medial frontal gyrus and in the orbital gyrus (BA 11). The third
cluster of deactivation (711 voxels in extent) was observed in the dorsomedial frontal
gyrus and paracentral lobule (BA 6 and 5). The smallest cluster of deactivation (605
voxels in extent) was centered on the border between the angular gyrus and postcen-
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Figure 10.3
Results from whole brain results in radiologic space for Voluntary Abstinence—Smoke Unavailable with signiﬁcant activations in black (voxel z > 2:3, maximum z ¼ 3:7, cluster level corrected
signiﬁcance of p < :05). Increases in BOLD signal during Voluntary Abstinence were observed in a
large cluster encompassing portions of the dACC and SMA, and smaller clusters in the right
DLPFC (SFG/MFG) and the right VLPFC (IFG), which encompassed part of the insula as well.

tral gyrus, encompassing portions of each within the right hemisphere (BA 2, 3, and
40).
Discussion
Our primarily goal was to develop a methodology for examining the neural activity
during voluntary control of smoking behavior. In order to accomplish this, we developed a method for making cigarette smoke available in the scanner (R21 DA13627–
02; Enabling Technologies in fMRI and Cigarette Smoking, PI Cohen). Smokers were then
faced with a situation in which the opportunity to smoke was available, though
discouraged, on some trials, whereas it was unavailable on other trials. It was necessary
that the procedure be sufﬁciently comfortable for participants that the relevant opportunity to smoke remained attractive. The fact that participants’ self-reports indicated
that they found it difﬁcult to not smoke on the trials in which smoke was available
(6.9 on a 10-point scale) indicates that this objective was met.
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Although both sides of the contrast included no physical behavior, relative to trials
in which smoke was not available, voluntary abstinence recruited activity in a network
of regions predominantly within the prefrontal cortex. In characterizing their inﬂuential integrative theory of prefrontal cortical functioning, Miller and Cohen (2001, 171)
write: ‘‘We assume that the PFC serves a speciﬁc function in cognitive control: the
active maintenance of patterns of activity that represent goals and the means to
achieve them. They provide bias signals throughout much of the rest of the brain,
affecting not only visual processes but also other sensory modalities, as well as systems
responsible for response execution, memory retrieval, emotional evaluation, etc.’’ At a
very general level, the activation of lateral portions of the prefrontal cortex may have
served the top-down biasing of the action plan to not smoke. The network of regions
‘‘deactivated’’ (i.e., those regions that showed relatively diminished activity during the
Voluntary Abstinence trials) in the primary contrast (including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulated cortex) are consistent with the ‘‘resting network’’/‘‘default network’’ identiﬁed during fMRI (i.e., the set of brain regions observed
to consistently deactivate during active task states; Buckner and Vincent 2007). This
provides further indication that not smoking when smoke was available was associated
with more cognitive processing than was not smoking when cigarette smoke was not
available.
Although current knowledge of the functional speciﬁcity of the aforementioned
brain regions is insufﬁcient to permit conclusive ‘‘reverse inferences’’ from region to
underlying function, we can offer some further speculation. The observed network is
consistent with the functional characterization of voluntary abstinence as including
top-down maintenance of task goals in working memory (prominently linked to the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Levy and Goldman-Rakic 2000), monitoring of conﬂict
or errors with respect to behavior and task goals (the anterior cingulate cortex; van
Veen et al. 2001), and the cancellation of initiated prepotent behaviors (the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; (Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack 2004). Robust recruitment in
supplementary motor areas is also intriguing, particularly in light of the fact that the
contrast included only those trials in which the participant did not smoke. It is possible that recruitment in these areas reﬂects motor ideation (behavior that was planned
but not executed). The high similarity between the identiﬁed network of regions and
activation reported during inhibitory control tasks like the Stroop (e.g., Bush et al.
1999) provides some support for the suggestion that inhibitory control tasks tap functions that are relevant to voluntary control of drug taking.
Differential Craving as a Potential Confound
There is an experimental confound related to craving in the present study that warrants discussion. The primary contrast subtracted fMRI signal while smoke was not
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available from those blocks in which participants voluntarily abstained from smoking.
Our goal was to isolate activity recruited by self-control efforts of the participant. However, the two above conditions may have included different levels of craving. If, for example, most self-control trials during which there was strong craving were dropped
from this contrast because the participants smoked, then, all else being equal, the average craving during Voluntary Abstinence trials would have been lower than that
of Smoke Unavailable trials. Alternatively, the availability of cigarette smoke on SelfControl trials may have led to stronger craving on Voluntary Abstinence trials relative
to Smoke Unavailable trials; it has, for example, been repeatedly observed that the expectation of imminent smoking increases craving (Carter and Tiffany 2001; Dols et al.
2000, 2002; Juliano and Brandon 1998). If craving differed across conditions, then signiﬁcant differences in neural recruitment may have reﬂected differences in craving
rather than self-control efforts. We have taken steps to disambiguate these factors in
an ongoing larger study using a similar methodology.
Taking Stock: What Needs to Be Done
In our view, the present study demonstrated the feasibility of measuring brain function
during a ‘‘self-control challenge’’ in cigarette smokers. However, we did not demonstrate that the brain activity we observed was associated with success in the challenge,
much less that it was causally relevant to success. There is nothing in the data that were
collected that, for example, indicates that higher activation within the prefrontal cortex during Smoke Available trials was associated with a lower rate of smoking. Ongoing
research is directed at this question. Assuming such an association is present, of course,
still does not establish that observed brain activity is a relevant determinant of the
behavior. In order to establish causal inﬂuence, it will be necessary to show that the
behavior is disrupted by alteration of function in the candidate brain regions. One
exciting possibility along these lines is to use repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to temporarily ‘‘knock out’’ a targeted brain region. This is feasible for
regions on or very near the surface of the cortex. With respect to the brain regions
identiﬁed in our analysis, certainly the dorsolateral prefrontal region would be a reasonable target for rTMS. It would be interesting to see if voluntary abstinence was
reduced when activity in this region was temporarily disrupted.
Even if the above steps were successfully taken, it is important to note that we would
not have established that the experimental paradigm described captures the sort of
functioning most relevant to actual success in overcoming an addiction. Indeed, we
have argued elsewhere (Ainslie 1975, 1992, 2001; Monterosso and Ainslie 2007) that
the most critical factor in gaining control over an addiction is the conceived connection between individual temptation and expectation regarding future behavior
(e.g., the idea that this one tempting cigarette is not really just this one, because there is
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something more signiﬁcant in the balance; see chapters 5, 8, and 9 in this volume).
The experimental situation that participants were placed in was not likely to engender
the cycles of resolution and regret that characterize the real-world struggle of addiction.
By instructing participants in such a way as to suggest that it was expected that they
would smoke some of the time, participants were likely always in a psychological state
that is incompatible with sustained cessation of addiction. For participants in the
study, not smoking did not take on the status of a personal rule that needed to be followed without fail. That is to say, smoking was maintained as an option throughout.
Successfully sustained cessation of an addiction may require that the behavior be seen
as off-limits at least most of the time.
The robust prefrontal activity observed during voluntary relative to involuntary abstinence may well reﬂect the effortful control of attention away from smoking ideation
(the imagery of the act that, left unchecked, leads smoothly to its initiation). It has
been argued that the essence of willpower involves the skillful direction of attention.
Philosopher Michael Bratman (1999) considers the mechanism of willpower to be an
avoidance of reconsidering one’s resolutions, and this idea dates back to at least William James: ‘‘The effort by which [a drunkard] succeeds in keeping the right name
unwaveringly present to his mind proves to be his saving moral act’’ ( James 1890,
565). But as we have recently argued elsewhere (Monterosso and Ainslie in press) the
control of attention is not itself the essence of willpower, and it probably cannot provide a basis for sustained cessation of drug use because it is not sufﬁciently reliable over
long time periods. Nevertheless, such control may well play a supporting role, increasing the chances of successfully resisting speciﬁc challenging temptations when, for
whatever reason, resolve is vulnerable. We believe that the reported study represents
an initial step toward understanding the dynamics of this control, and that future research efforts in this area can proﬁt from looking at the relationship between brain
function and actual behavior during attempts at smoking cessation.
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Notes
1. First, we performed a rapid localization study in the sagittal plane using gradient echo methods
(TR/TE 68/7.5 ms, matrix 256  128, ﬂip angle 30 , FOV 26 cm, 5-mm thickness and gap, scan
time 35.6 s) (Frahm, Merboldt, and Hanicke 1993). Based on this localizer, we then used an EPIbased shimming procedure (Reese, Davis, and Weisskoff 1995) to establish a typical r.m.s. ﬁeld
uniformity of <15 Hz (<0.12 ppm) over the entire head. Next, two functional runs of the Self-
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Control Challenge were acquired using standard gradient-echo EPI scanning (TR ¼ 2000 ms,
TE ¼ 45 ms). Data were acquired with 3.125 mm2 pixels within plane, and with slice thickness of
4 mm with 1 mm skip, acquiring 26 slices. After completion of the test runs, we collected a scan
series of high-resolution EPI images (Cohen and Weisskoff 1991) in the same planes (TR 6s, TE 54
ms, 128  128 matrix, 20-cm FOV, 4 NEX, scan time 24 s). These T2-weighted images have the
same bandwidth and, therefore, the same shape distortions (Cohen and Weisskoff 1991) as the
functional data and as such are valuable in providing accurate image registration and localization.
2. Each BOLD time series was motion-corrected using MCFLIRT, part of FSL (FMRIB Software Library) (Smith et al. 2004). The data sets were smoothed with a nonlinear algorithm designed to
preserve image structure by only smoothing over voxels classiﬁed as the same tissue type (5-mm
kernel) (Smith and Brady 1997). Each data set was subjected to a multiple-regression analysis,
using a prewhitening technique (Woolrich et al. 2001) to account for the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of BOLD imaging (Zarahn, Aguirre, and D’Esposito 1997). Z scores and parameter
estimates were computed for the comparison of the time course of each intracranial voxel to the
HRF-smoothed stimulus waveform using FEAT, part of FSL. Functional data from each run were
normalized ﬁrst to the matched bandwidth high-resolution T2 scan, and then to an FSL standard
space template in MNI space.
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